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DUTIES OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
TO THE PRO SE LITIGANT 
MARK ANDREWS* 
ABSTRACT 
Alaska courts have assisted unrepresented litigants in civil cases, explaining 
procedural technicalities to pro se litigants and applying more lenient 
standards to pro se pleadings. Although the origin of this policy is unclear, 
the Alaska Supreme Court in Breck v. Ulmer held that the trial court should 
advise pro se litigants of procedural requirements and hold pro se litigants to 
less stringent standards than attorneys. However, two recent cases, 
Greenway v. Heathcott and Wagner v. Wagner, have complicated 
Alaska’s policy by adopting different approaches regarding when a court 
should advise a pro se litigant of procedural requirements. This Article 
proposes that, based on the State’s recognition of a constitutional right to 
represent oneself, Alaska courts apply a due process analysis to judicial duties 
toward self-represented litigants to ensure that courts consistently recognize 
and protect pro se litigants’ interests. 
INTRODUCTION 
Across the United States, an increased number of litigants have 
chosen to forego attorneys and instead represent themselves in court, 
particularly in civil matters. The State of Alaska has seen a similar 
upward trend in pro se litigants.1 This is particularly obvious in fields 
such as family law. In an estimated twenty-five percent of contested 
domestic relations cases in Alaska, both parties have lawyers.2 In the 
remaining seventy-five percent of cases, however, either one or both of 
the parties represent themselves.3 Among domestic relations cases that 
are uncontested or have post-judgment proceedings, ninety-five percent 
of litigants are unrepresented.4 
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 1.  Katherine Alteneder, Literacy and the Courts, 24 ALASKA JUST. F. 1 (2007). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
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Since deciding Breck v. Ulmer5 in 1987, the Alaska Supreme Court 
has held the pleadings of some pro se litigants to a less stringent 
standard than represented parties, even finding in some cases an 
affirmative duty of the trial court to explain to pro se litigants the 
technical points of procedure.6 In addition to increasing access to the 
courts, this policy of pro se leniency has promoted the resolution of 
disputes on their merits, rather than on technical errors made by an 
unrepresented party. 
For twenty-five years, Breck served as a useful guidepost for 
dealing with the actions of pro se litigants. Within the last year, 
however, the Alaska Supreme Court has decided two cases that have 
rendered this policy of leniency in Alaska less clear.7 As a result, it has 
lost some of its force. Wagner v. Wagner8 and Greenway v. Heathcott9 not 
only bring the applicability of the pro se leniency policy into question, 
but they also create conflicting precedent in the Alaska court system. 
This Article examines the question of what degree of procedural 
flexibility is owed to an unrepresented civil litigant10 in Alaska trial 
courts, and calls on the Alaska Supreme Court to resolve the issue to 
promote a coherent, consistent, and useful policy that protects the pro se 
party. First, this Article explores whether there is any grounding for the 
policy of leniency outside of case law. Next, it traces and summarizes 
the development of the pro se leniency policy in Alaska case law 
through 2012. Finally, the Article discusses the two most recent cases, 
 
 5.  745 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1023 (1988). 
 6.  Id. at 75. 
 7.  Wagner v. Wagner, 299 P.3d 170 (Alaska 2013); Greenway v. Heathcott, 
294 P.3d 1056 (Alaska 2013). 
 8.  299 P.3d 170 (Alaska 2013). 
 9.  294 P.3d 1056 (Alaska 2013). 
 10.  This Article is limited to discussing the pro se civil litigant. There is no 
analysis of criminal cases or appellate procedure. Except where federal cases 
affect Alaska law, federal authority is not discussed. It is worth noting that there 
exists a group of cases where the accommodation granted to the pro se litigant in 
a civil case is the appointment of counsel. See, e.g., In re Alaska Network on 
Domestic Violence & Sexual Assault, 264 P.3d 835, 838 (Alaska 2011) (“This 
emphasis on fairness and equal advantage indicates that the right to counsel 
where the opposing party is represented by a public agency arises, at least in 
part, from the government’s otherwise one-sided support for the party with an 
attorney supplied by a public agency.”); Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (Alaska 
1979) (holding that the due process clause of State Constitution guaranteed wife, 
an indigent party, the right to court-appointed counsel in a private child custody 
proceeding in which her spouse was represented by Alaska legal services 
corporation). By and large, in these cases, the appointment of counsel is based 
on the court’s recognition of the importance of the specific substantive issues in 
dispute, rather than any acknowledgment of a policy of leniency toward the pro 
se litigant. These cases grant the right of counsel when one might not otherwise 
be able to afford counsel, when the litigant is litigating against a public agency. 
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Wagner and Greenway, and highlights the confusion and uncertainty 
these decisions are likely to create.  
I. THE POLICY OF PRO SE LENIENCY LACKS A CLEAR 
SOURCE IN ALASKA LAW 
The unrepresented litigant in Alaska receives procedural leniency, 
but the initial source of such a policy is unclear. There is nothing 
explicitly requiring such treatment in the Alaska Constitution, the 
Alaska Statutes, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
There is ample authority that the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure 
should be interpreted to promote the “just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”11 The trial court may 
relax the Rules when “strict adherence to them would work a manifest 
injustice.”12 But these Rules apply to every litigant. The Rules lack a 
policy that specifically covers civil litigants who are unrepresented. Due 
process protections within the United States Constitution may also 
provide some basis for the policy of pro se leniency. Recently, the 
United States Supreme Court held in Turner v. Rogers13 that the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires state assistance to the unrepresented 
civil litigant when the possible outcome includes incarceration.14 The 
required state assistance sometimes, but not always, extends to 
appointment of counsel.15 Even when state assistance does not go so far 
as to appoint counsel, the risk of incarceration still calls for some higher 
degree of due process protection. Accordingly, “the State must . . . have 
in place alternative procedures that assure a fundamentally fair 
determination of the critical incarceration-related question.”16 
The Alaska Supreme Court has never cited Turner v. Rogers, and the 
opinion does not stand for any general constitutional right to leniency in 
favor of unrepresented parties. It is also, of course, narrowed by the fact 
that there must be a risk of incarceration to invoke its holding. 
Nonetheless, the case suggests that there is some foundation in the 
Fourteenth Amendment for a policy of pro se leniency, and Alaska 
courts should draw on this principle to extend due process to self-
representation. 
 
 11.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 1 (“Scope of Rules – Construction”). 
 12.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 94 (“Relaxation of Rules”). 
 13.  131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). 
 14.  Id. at 2512. 
 15.  Id. at 2518. 
 16.  Id. at 2512. 
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II. DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS SHOULD EXTEND TO THE 
RIGHT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION 
Alaska recognizes a constitutional right to represent oneself. In 
McCracken v. State,17 the Alaska Supreme Court found that the right to 
self-representation was among the rights retained by the people under 
the Alaska Constitution.18  
In McCracken, a prisoner filed a petition for writ of habeus corpus 
in the Juneau Superior Court and requested to represent himself.19 The 
Alaska Supreme Court held there was a right to self-representation 
under the Alaska Constitution, but that the right is not absolute.20 
For the Due Process Clause to apply, “an individual interest [must 
be] of sufficient importance to warrant constitutional protection.”21 
Following the decision in McCracken v. State, the right to represent 
oneself in court should be considered one such interest and thus should 
be entitled to due process protection.22 This interest is subject to the 
same analysis as any other under the Due Process Clause.23 In 1977, in 
City of Homer v. State,24 the Alaska Supreme Court adopted the federal 
due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge25 the previous 
year.26 Mathews found that when a federal statute enacted Social Security 
 
 17.  518 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1974). 
 18.  Id. at 91. 
 19.  Id. at 87. 
 20.  Id. at 91. The Court recommended a two-part test where: (1) the judge 
must ascertain whether a prisoner is capable of presenting his allegations in a 
rational and coherent manner, and (2) the judge must believe the prisoner 
understands precisely what they are giving up by declining the assistance of 
counsel. Id. 
 21.  Matson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 785 P.2d 1200, 
1206 (Alaska 1990) (quoting Nichols v. Eckert, 504 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Alaska 1973)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
 22.  See McCracken, 518 P.2d at 91 (“The opportunity to present one’s own 
position where liberty itself is at stake should not lightly be disregarded, and the 
right to counsel should not be used as a bar to self-representation.”). 
 23.  See City of Homer v. State, Dep’t of Natural Res., 566 P.2d 1314 (Alaska 
1977) (applying due process analysis to a municipal corporation’s claim to 
tidelands). 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 26.  City of Homer, 566 P.2d at 1319 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35) 
(“[T]he specific dictates of due process generally involve the consideration of 
three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural 
requirements would entail.”). 
ANDREWS_V12_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/2013 1:49 PM 
2013 DUTIES TO THE PRO SE LITIGANT 193 
benefits, the statute created a property interest protected by the due 
process clause.27 In Alaska the right to self-representation is secured by 
statute.28 Later, in In re Urie, the Alaska Supreme Court similarly used 
the Eldridge test: 
Under due process we will review the bar rule 
provision [relating to admissions] by considering three 
main factors: (1) the nature of the private interest 
affected, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that 
interest by the procedures used, and the probable value, 
if any, of any additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards, and (3) the state’s interest, including the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or 
substitute procedural requirements would entail.29 
Due process protects the right to self-representation from arbitrary 
denial. It ensures a pro se litigant’s claim will be heard despite a 
litigant’s potential lack of familiarity with procedure.30 Due process, 
however, has its inherent limits: relaxed procedures must not deprive 
the opposing party of his own rights to due process, and must preserve 
the impartiality of the court. 
Standing alone, the constitutional right to represent oneself is 
settled in Alaska law. However, the Alaska Supreme Court has never 
expanded McCracken to require a policy of leniency toward pro se 
litigants under the Alaska Constitution. The right to self-representation 
presents some distinct due process issues. Considerations unique to the 
policy of leniency make the due process analysis more difficult than in 
other scenarios. For example, other due process questions typically 
involve two adverse parties, with the court as a neutral decision maker. 
But as to pro se litigants, the court must also protect its role as a neutral 
decision maker. The Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, which consists of 
five canons intended to establish standards for the ethical conduct of 
judges, emphasizes that a judge must be mindful of judicial integrity 
and must maintain the appearance of neutrality and fairness.31 All five 
judicial canons of conduct deal in some way with impartiality and the 
restraint on behavior that impartiality requires.32  
 
 27.  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333. 
 28.  ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.040(a) (2013). 
 29.  In re Urie, 617 P.2d 505, 508 & n.5 (Alaska 1980). 
 30.  See Haines v. Kerner, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972) (noting that pro se 
pleadings are held to a “less stringent standard” than “formal pleadings drafted 
by lawyers”). See also infra discussion Part III. 
 31.  ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3–4 (1998). 
 32.  ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1–5 (1998). 
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The trial court sometimes has an affirmative duty to advise pro se 
litigants about certain things, such as the need to include affidavits 
when opposing summary judgment33 or the method by which a party 
may attempt to withdraw admitted statements.34 When the trial court 
gives such advice, its own neutrality may become an issue. The Alaska 
Supreme Court has taken note of the trial court’s sensitive role when 
giving advice to a pro se litigant, requiring trial courts to offer guidance 
when doing so would not constitute “open-ended participation by the 
court [that] would be difficult to contain.”35 At the same time, however, 
the Alaska Supreme Court has held that step-by-step assistance to the 
litigant is not permitted.36 Such help might force the judge to become the 
advocate for one side.37 Additionally, when considering the affirmative 
duty to advise the litigant, the court has also noted the judiciary’s own 
interest in judicial efficiency.38 Providing litigants step-by-step advice 
and help, in addition to prompting concerns over neutrality, also strains 
judicial resources. 
 Another due process issue unique to pro se litigants is what role the 
Rules of Civil Procedure should play. The Rules attempt to define a fair 
method of procedure,39 but an unrepresented litigant seems to call for 
exceptions. In effect, courts liberally interpret the Rules to the benefit of 
pro se litigants. As described above, this is supported by Rule 1, which 
states that courts should consider the goals of fairness, speed, and cost,40 
and Rule 94, which allows the rules to be relaxed or dispensed with 
when necessary.41 However, the Rules also place a premium on uniform 
treatment. The Alaska Supreme Court has noted that the Rules were 
promulgated for the “specific purpose of giving fair and reasonable 
notice to all parties of the appropriate procedural standards that should 
be uniformly applied when any party, including a pro se litigant, seeks 
relief in [civil litigation].”42 Reconciling the preference for efficiency and 
 
 33.  Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987). 
 34.  Genaro v. Municipality of Anchorage, 76 P.3d 844, 845–47 (Alaska 2003). 
 35.  Id. at 847 n.12 (quoting Bauman v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 
768 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Alaska 1989)). 
 36.  See Shooshanian v. Dire, 237 P.3d 618, 624 (Alaska 2010) (quoting 
Bauman, 768 P.2d at 1099) (“[A] trial court is not required to ‘instruct a pro se 
litigant as to each step in litigating a claim’ because such involved assistance 
‘would compromise the court’s impartiality in deciding the case by forcing the 
judge to act as an advocate for one side.’”). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Greenway v. Heathcott, 294 P.3d 1056, 1071 (Alaska 2013). 
 39.  See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules shall be construed to secure the 
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 94. 
 42.  Bauman, 768 P.2d at 1099 (emphasis added). 
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fairness with the preference for uniformity creates problems when 
applying the Rules to pro se litigants. 
Another source of difficulty stems from the diverse population of 
pro se litigants.43 For the represented litigant, the judge can rely upon a 
set of expectations of what the attorney will know. With a pro se litigant, 
on the other hand, the judge is likely unaware of how much legal 
knowledge any particular pro se litigant has. Thus, it is unclear what 
degree of leniency is necessary to permit a fair result for a particular 
unrepresented party.44 
The Alaska Supreme Court has addressed this consideration by 
requiring pro se litigants to educate themselves during their case.45 The 
pro se litigant has a duty to attempt to comply with the Rules of Civil 
Procedure.46 In reviewing pro se cases, the Alaska Supreme Court 
regularly considers the degree to which the unrepresented litigant has 
participated in hearings.47 Those pro se litigants who are engaged in 
their case are more likely to receive leniency.48 The degree to which a 
litigant must be engaged, however, has recently become much less 
clear.49 
 
 43.  See Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management 
and Fairness in Pro Se Cases: A Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of 
New York, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 319–61 (2002) (analyzing the parties, cases, 
and claims made in the federal pro se docket in the Southern District of New 
York and finding a diversity of parties). 
 44.  In McCracken v. State, the court found “the trial judge should satisfy 
himself that the prisoner understands precisely what he is giving up by 
declining the assistance of counsel.” 518 P.2d 85, 91 (Alaska 1974). 
 45.  See Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800, 803 (Alaska 2002) (“The litigant is 
expected to make a good faith effort to comply with judicial procedures.”); see 
also Coffland v. Coffland, 4 P.3d 317, 321 (Alaska 2000) (“A pro se litigant must 
make some attempt with the court’s procedures before receiving the benefit of 
the court’s leniency.”). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See Coffland, 4 P.3d at 320 (finding the trial judge only entered sanctions 
after the pro se litigant “demonstrated an unwillingness to cooperate” by not 
responding to motions, filing documents in a timely manner, and failing to 
appear at pretrial proceedings). 
 48.  Compare Genaro v. Municipality of Anchorage, 76 P.3d 844, 845–47 
(Alaska 2003) (allowing the pro se litigant procedural leniency in part because of 
her good faith attempt at procedural compliance), with Coffland, 4 P.3d at 321 
(denying the pro se litigant procedural leniency because he made no effort to 
comply with the court rules and procedure). 
 49.  See Wagner v. Wagner, 299 P.3d 170, 173–74 (Alaska 2013) (finding that a 
telephone request amounted to an implied request for continuance). But see 
Greenway v. Heathcott, 294 P.3d 1056, 1070 (Alaska 2013) (finding that repeated 
expressions of concern did not constitute a request for continuance). 
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRO SE LENIENCY POLICY IN ALASKA 
The judicial policy of granting leniency to pro se litigants has a long 
history and first emerged at the federal level as early as the 1940s.50 The 
modern expression of this policy, however, began in 1972 with Haines v. 
Kerner.51 In Haines, the federal district court dismissed a prisoner’s pro se 
complaint without allowing him an opportunity to present evidence.52 
In reversing the judgment, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” were sufficient to raise a 
claim.53 The Court further stated: 
We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the 
pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards 
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears “beyond 
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 
his claim which would entitle him to relief.”54 
Haines did not cite a source for its pronouncement of a less 
stringent standard for the pleadings of pro se litigants, and neither did it 
rest its result on the United States Constitution, the United States Code, 
or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, Haines rested on 
nothing but itself to create the foundation for the modern expression of 
the policy and its peculiar place in the law.  
In 1974, two years after Haines, the Alaska Supreme Court found a 
constitutional right to self-representation in McCracken v. State.55 Though 
the court did not expressly extend McCracken to require leniency toward 
pro se civil litigants under due process, the Alaska Supreme Court 
adopted a set of policies that favor the pro se litigant in its decision in 
Breck v. Ulmer.56 
In Breck, after filing a response to the defendants’ answer, the pro se 
plaintiff learned that a reply pleading requires leave of court and 
subsequently filed a motion for such leave.57 The motion was denied by 
 
 50.  See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775–76 (2d Cir. 1944) (finding a 
pro se litigant’s inartfully pleaded complaint was sufficient to withstand 
dismissal on the face of the complaint). 
 51.  404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam). 
 52.  Id. at 520. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 521 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)). The 
United States Supreme Court has since modified the “no set of facts” provision 
in Conley. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The Alaska 
Supreme Court has yet to address the modification. 
 55.  McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1974). 
 56.  745 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1987). 
 57.  Id. at 69. 
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the lower court.58 While the Alaska Supreme Court upheld this denial, 
finding that the district court had not abused its discretion and that any 
error to the litigant was not prejudicial, the court did agree that more 
leniency should have been afforded to the pro se litigant.59 
Breck established two standards of leniency for pro se litigants. 
First, “the pleadings of pro se litigants should be held to less stringent 
standards than those of lawyers.”60 Second, “the trial judge should 
inform a pro se litigant of the proper procedure for the action he or she is 
obviously attempting to accomplish.”61 Breck did not cite the Alaska 
Constitution or due process as the source of a judicial duty to advise pro 
se litigants, nor did it cite to McCracken for a constitutional right of self-
representation. Similarly, Haines did not cite to the United States 
Constitution or consider due process concerns. Though pro se litigants 
have occasionally claimed a violation of due process as the source of 
trial court error,62 even when reversing the trial court, the Alaska 
Supreme Court has never stated that the Due Process Clause protects the 
actions of unrepresented litigants.63 
Since Breck, the court has modified its leniency policy to account for 
the variances in pro se cases. These modifications have reflected the 
court’s notion that pro se leniency is rooted in a sense of fairness. A pro 
se litigant must still meet some minimum level of competency before the 
court allows for procedural leniency. 
 For example, in Bauman v. State, Division of Family & Youth 
Services,64 the court created a “common knowledge” exception to the 
rule of leniency.65 In Bauman, the plaintiffs, appearing pro se, did not 
oppose the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.66 After the 
motion was granted, the plaintiffs argued that they should have been 
notified of the requirements of the summary judgment procedure.67 
While acknowledging the notion of leniency established in Breck, the 
 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 75. 
 60.  Id. (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  E.g., Berry v. Berry, 277 P.3d 771, 774 (Alaska 2012); Willoya v. State, 
Dep’t of Corr., 53 P.3d 1115, 1124 (Alaska 2002). 
 63.  See, e.g., Wagner v. Wagner, 299 P.3d 170, 174 (Alaska 2013) (basing the 
reversal of the trial court on the leniency afforded to pro se litigants and the 
court’s failure to inform the litigant of the proper procedure); Genaro v. 
Municipality of Anchorage, 76 P.3d 844 (Alaska 2003) (basing the reversal of the 
trial court on the court’s failure to advise a pro se litigant on the proper 
procedure). 
 64.  768 P.2d 1097 (Alaska 1989). 
 65.  Id. at 1099. 
 66.  Id. at 1098. 
 67.  Id. 
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court was unwilling to extend this leniency when the plaintiffs did not 
even file a defective pleading.68 The failure of the pro se litigant in 
Bauman fell below the level of competency that the trial court should 
expect of a pro se party. In recognizing that it is “common knowledge 
that initiating and pursuing a civil lawsuit can be a difficult and 
complex procedure,” the court established a minimum “common 
knowledge” threshold for pro se litigants to meet.69 In order to meet this 
threshold, it is up to the pro se litigant to “familiarize himself or herself 
with the rules of procedure.”70 
Since Bauman, the court has continued to require some minimum 
compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. First, when the pro se 
litigant is aware of the correct procedures, the trial court has no duty to 
advise the litigant further.71 Second, in Coffland v. Coffland,72 the court 
held that “[a] pro se litigant must make some attempt to comply with 
the court’s procedures before receiving the benefit of the court’s 
leniency.”73 
In Coffland, the pro se litigant repeatedly ignored discovery 
requests and motions, never made an effort to comply with the court’s 
procedures, and never asked for the court’s assistance.74 The litigant’s 
failure to comply with procedures did not meet the expected minimum 
level of competency. In subsequent cases, this standard has been 
expressed as requiring “a good faith” attempt to comply.75 Genaro v. 
Municipality of Anchorage,76 decided in 2003, is one of the few cases 
where the Alaska Supreme Court has applied the Breck standard, 
holding that the trial court did not meet it. The court remanded the case 
because the trial court failed to adequately advise a pro se litigant.77 
Before Genaro, in order to receive leniency, a pro se litigant had to 
affirmatively ask for help78 or file an obviously defective pleading.79 
 
 68.  Id. at 1099. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Willoya v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 53 P.3d 1115, 1123 (Alaska 2002). 
 72.  4 P.3d 317 (Alaska 2000). 
 73.  Id. at 321. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  See, e.g., Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800, 804 (Alaska 2002) (holding that if a 
pro se litigant does not make a good faith effort to comply with the procedural 
rules a court may deny procedural leniency). 
 76.  76 P.3d 844 (Alaska 2003). 
 77.  Id. at 847. 
 78.  See Coffland, 4 P.3d at 321 (Alaska 2000) (noting that the pro se litigant 
never asked for assistance in complying with the court’s orders and therefore 
refusing to grant him leniency). 
 79.  See Bauman v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 768 P.2d 1097, 1099 
(Alaska 1989) (refusing to extend pro se leniency to a situation in which the 
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Genaro, however, expanded a trial court’s duty to advise a pro se litigant 
even when no proper pleading has been filed, as long as the litigant’s 
intent is obvious.80 
Genaro rests on the unrepresented party’s determined, if somewhat 
misplaced, efforts to litigate her case. After Genaro filed suit, a 
bankruptcy trustee was briefly given responsibility for her case.81 Once 
Genaro had been reinstated as plaintiff, the defendant sent Genaro 
requests for admissions which Genaro never answered.82 The defendant 
was granted summary judgment over Genaro’s objection that the 
bankruptcy trustee had responded to the requests.83 The court held the 
requests were admitted due to Genaro’s failure to respond.84  
 In reversing the lower court’s decision, the Alaska Supreme Court 
held that even though Genaro never asked the superior court how to 
withdraw statements deemed admitted, Genaro’s efforts in opposing 
and objecting to the defendant’s motion were a signal to the trial court 
that she was attempting to withdraw the admissions.85 
Relying on Breck, Bauman, and Coffland, the Genaro court held that a 
trial court has a duty to advise. The court found that “it was an abuse of 
discretion not to inform Genaro of the proper procedure for the 
action . . . she [was] obviously attempting to accomplish.”86 The court 
took note of the technical nature of the Rules of Civil Procedure, in 
effect, finding that the particular procedure of withdrawing admitted 
statements was outside the common knowledge of what a litigant 
should be expected to know.87 
Genaro also began to define the scope of judicial neutrality. The 
court found that providing advice to a pro se litigant does not require 
“open-ended participation by the court [that] would be difficult to 
contain.”88 Similarly, the court found that informing the litigant of the 
“technical defects” in any pro se pleadings does not “compromise the 
superior court’s impartiality.”89 Genaro’s affirmation of the duty to 
advise, then, also suggests the limits of such duty. Any leniency that 
 
plaintiffs did not file a defective pleading). 
 80.  Genaro, 76 P.3d at 846. 
 81.  Id. at 845. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 846. 
 86.  Id. at 847 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 87.  See id. at 846 (“[T]he rules of court may be models of clarity to one 
schooled in the law, [but] a pro se litigant might not find them so.”) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 88.  Id. at 847 (quoting Bauman, 768 P.2d at 1099). 
 89.  Id. 
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would compromise the court’s impartiality should not be granted. 
Following Genaro, the Alaska Supreme Court continued to expand 
Breck. In 2012, in Berry v. Berry,90 a pro se litigant argued that the 
superior court violated his due process rights by ordering an accelerated 
briefing schedule outside of the normal procedural rules.91 While the 
court did not reach the merits of the issue, the court cautioned in dicta: 
“[I]t would have been preferable for the court to explain in greater detail 
to this pro se litigant the consequences of accelerating the schedule.”92 
Thus, the court continued to emphasize the importance of providing 
leniency to pro se litigants. 
IV. GREENWAY AND WAGNER CREATE AN UNCERTAIN 
FUTURE FOR THE ALASKA POLICY OF PRO SE LENIENCY 
A. Greenway and Wagner: The Alaska Policy of Leniency Loses 
Clarity 
In 2013, two cases significantly affected Breck: Greenway v. 
Heathcott93 and Wagner v. Wagner.94 Both cases decided what actions by a 
pro se litigant constitute a motion that the trial court must recognize. 
While both litigants failed to comply with court rules, the litigant in 
Greenway lost and the litigant in Wagner won. Together, the two 
conflicting opinions compromise the overall clarity of Breck. 
Furthermore, Wagner’s expansion of Breck promises difficulties for the 
trial bench, for attorneys who face unrepresented parties, and for the 
parties themselves. 
In Greenway, the pro se litigant frequently expressed her concern 
about the absence of a witness and the need for that person’s testimony. 
Despite this, the court held these expressions did not constitute a request 
for continuance.95 Her attempt to call a government agent as a witness 
was unsuccessful, as the United States quashed Greenway’s subpoena.96 
On appeal, Greenway argued that the trial court should have granted 
her a continuance so that she could obtain the testimony of the witness 
and that the court should have inferred a request for relief by her 
“repeated exclamations” that the specific witness was needed.97  
 
 90.  277 P.3d 771 (Alaska 2012). 
 91.  Id. at 774. 
 92.  Id. at 775 n.11. 
 93.  294 P.3d 1056 (Alaska 2013). 
 94.  299 P.3d 170 (Alaska 2013). 
 95.  Greenway, 294 P.3d at 1070. 
 96.  Id. at 1060–61. 
 97.  Id. at 1070. 
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In finding there was no formal continuance request, the court 
considered whether Greenway’s actions “conveyed an informal request 
that should have put the court on notice” that she wanted a 
continuance.98 Effectively applying the “common knowledge” rule of 
Bauman,99 the court observed that such a request is not “inherently 
complex.”100 In fact, Greenway had made similar continuance requests 
in the past.101 Ultimately, the court determined that “[n]either her actual 
words nor the tenor of her comments put the court on notice that 
Greenway was asking for relief, rather than expressing 
disappointment.”102 
Given Breck, it is not clear why Greenway’s actions were not 
accepted as a continuance request. Under Breck, the trial court should 
“inform a pro se litigant of the proper procedure for the action he or she 
is obviously attempting to accomplish.”103 Later cases, including Genaro, 
reiterated the court’s affirmative role.104 It is unclear why Greenway’s 
“repeated exclamations” of her concerns were insufficient to show her 
intent. Even assuming her remarks were only expressions of 
disappointment,105 Greenway’s remarks, combined with her 
unsuccessful attempt to subpoena the federal witness,106 should have 
made plain what she was “obviously attempting to accomplish.”107 
A few weeks later after Greenway was decided, Wagner held that a 
telephoned request asking for continuance the day before trial, while not 
the proper procedure, could constitute a legitimate continuance request 
when the procedural error might have resulted from trial court error.108 
In Wagner, a pro se litigant telephoned the court clerk the day before 
trial to say that he could not appear.109 The trial court did not inform 
Wagner that his method of requesting a continuance by telephone call 
was improper, even though Wagner had used this method twice 
 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Bauman v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 768 P.2d 1097, 1099 
(Alaska 1989). 
 100.  Greenway, 294 P.3d at 1070. 
 101.  Id. at 1071. 
 102.  Id. at 1070. 
 103.  Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987). 
 104.  See, e.g., Genaro v. Municipality of Anchorage, 76 P.3d 844, 847 (Alaska 
2003) (holding that the court should have informed the pro se litigant of the 
proper procedure for the withdrawal of admissions when the litigant clearly 
indicated the desire to do so). 
 105.  Greenway, 294 P.3d at 1070. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Breck, 745 P.2d at 75; Genaro, 76 P.3d at 846. 
 108.  Wagner v. Wagner, 299 P.3d 170, 174 (Alaska 2013). 
 109.  Id. at 172. 
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before.110 The court ruled that his absence was voluntary, denied a 
continuance, and held the trial without Wagner.111 On appeal, the legal 
question was whether Wagner’s actions constituted a motion that the 
court should have considered.112 
Ultimately, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that the motion 
should have been considered.113 The court concluded that his “phone 
call the day before trial and his failure to file a motion or submit an 
affidavit as required by Civil Rule 40(e) constitute a lack of familiarity 
with the rules rather than gross neglect or lack of good faith.”114 
The court found that three factors supported this conclusion. The 
first was established under Breck: “the relaxed standards for pro se 
litigants.”115 The second and third factors created the new duties of the 
trial court: the litigant “may have reasonably concluded that his earlier 
telephonic requests for continuances to the judicial assistant were 
acceptable”116 and he “was never ordered to cease calling for 
continuances and advised that he needed to file a motion for 
continuance.”117 Thus, his telephone call constituted a “legitimate 
request for a continuance.”118 Wagner greatly expanded the leniency 
granted to the pro se litigant. Today, the trial court must consider 
whether its own silence might have left a misimpression in the mind of 
the pro se litigant about proper procedure, and must consider pleadings 
with defects that may have arisen out of such misimpressions. 
 This creates a low threshold before the court has some duty to 
consider an implied motion. This duty may arise if the pro se litigant 
“may have reasonably concluded” that a procedure was correct.119 Once 
a duty has arisen, the trial court must analyze the history and impact of 
its own actions to assure that it might not have given the unrepresented 
person the wrong impression.120 
Although the outcome in Wagner differed from the recent decision 
in Greenway, only Justice Winfree dissented in Wagner: 
The court today . . . apparently add[s] another rule for 
 
 110.  Id. at 173. 
 111.  Id. at 172–73. 
 112.  Id. at 173. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 174 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. Note that an actual erroneous conclusion is unnecessary. The 
reasonable probability of an erroneous conclusion suffices. 
 120.  Id. 
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dealing with pro se litigants—implicit in today’s 
decision is a rule that a trial court must issue written 
orders explaining substantive rulings and procedural 
requirements to pro se litigants who decline both to 
attend a scheduled court hearing and to make an effort 
to determine what occurred at the hearing.121 
Justice Winfree was likely correct in his assessment of the impact of the 
Wagner ruling. Among other things, the Alaska Supreme Court includes 
considerations of judicial efficiency when determining the degree of 
flexibility that the court provides to an unrepresented litigant.122 
Although the caseload of the Alaska trial bench has remained 
remarkably constant in recent years,123 the new affirmative duties under 
Wagner might further strain judicial resources. In Wagner, the court 
found an implied motion where the litigant had routinely failed to 
appear in court.124 This type of hand-holding for litigants who are not 
engaged in their own cases could be detrimental to the adversary system 
and the impartiality of the court. 
B. An Uncertain Future for Pro Se Leniency after Greenway and 
Wagner 
Greenway and Wagner muddy waters that were clear under Breck, 
and today, the usefulness of Breck is less certain.  
A due process analysis that recognized a protected interest in self-
representation would have been the better tool to resolve these two 
cases, especially Wagner. A due process analysis would balance the 
constitutionally protected interests of both parties.125 The first element 
examines the nature of the private interest.126 The second element 
analyzes the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest and the 
necessity of additional safeguards to protect it.127 In Wagner, as both 
litigants appeared pro se, the two parties each held a protected interest 
 
 121.  Id. at 178 n.1 (Winfree, J. dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 122.  Shooshnian v. Dire, 237 P.3d 618, 624 (Alaska 2010). 
 123.  RYAN FORTSON & BRAD A. MYRSTOL, ALASKA JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
CTR., UNIV. OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE, ALASKA TRIAL COURT CASE FILING STATISTICS, 
2005-2012, (Apr. 2013), http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/ajsac/2013/ajsac.13-
04.trial_courts.pdf. 
 124.  Wagner, 299 P.3d at 174. 
 125.  See In re Urie, 617 P.2d 505, 508 (Alaska 1980) (citations omitted) 
(detailing the factors used to establish whether due process scrutiny has been 
satisfied). 
 126.  Id. at 508. 
 127.  Id. 
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in self-representation. The interests of one would have been affected by 
any remedy granted to the other. Under due process, the plaintiff’s 
rights would have properly been considered alongside the defendant’s. 
The third element of the due process analysis is the interest of the 
State.128 In Wagner, the State’s interest was maintaining an impartial and 
efficient judicial system. Thus, under due process analysis, the extensive 
affirmative duty created in Wagner imposes a heavy burden on the trial 
judge, who must preserve the impartiality of the court.129  
Prior to Wagner, under Breck and cases that followed, the trial court 
would listen to the unrepresented litigant or read the pleadings, then 
advise the litigant of any defects, and allow the opportunity to cure. 
Wagner changed that practice. Today the trial court must consider 
whether its own silence might be the source of the litigant’s error.130 The 
judge must estimate what the litigant could have been thinking—not 
necessarily what the litigant actually thought. The prior decision in 
Greenway complicates the Wagner holding: the litigant’s energetic 
behavior might constitute no more than an “expression” that has not yet 
solidified into a “motion.”131 If the trial court considers a motion the 
litigants did not intend, the court risks unfairness to the opposing party. 
The lawyer who represents the opposing party faces related 
problems which affect the lawyer’s duty to zealously advocate for her 
own client’s position.132 In Wagner, a risk of mischaracterization was 
found the day of trial.133 If the lawyer suspects that the court might have 
left an opposing pro se litigant with the wrong impression, the client’s 
case might be delayed if the misimpression is discovered late in the 
proceedings. While not wanting the case to be delayed, the lawyer is 
hard-pressed to contact the unrepresented opponent, for fear of alerting 
the opponent to issues that might have not occurred to him. 
CONCLUSION 
Recognizing a protected interest in representing oneself is essential 
to preserving a workable policy of leniency toward pro se litigants. The 
judicial policy that favors leniency toward pro se litigants plays a 
valuable role in assuring access to the courts and the resolution of 
disputes on their merits. However, the policy must be anchored to 
something secure. At present, the policy lacks this security and thus is 
 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, 3 (2012). 
 130.  Wagner v. Wagner, 299 P.3d 170, 174 (Alaska 2013). 
 131.  Greenway v. Heathcott, 294 P.3d 1056, 1070 (Alaska 2013). 
 132.  ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. § 2 (2012). 
 133.  Wagner, 299 P.3d at 174. 
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vulnerable to nominal flexibility and arbitrariness. 
Given the different results in Greenway and Wagner, the current 
policy of leniency has little predictive value, thus depriving the trial 
court of guidance as to what procedures it must follow, and depriving 
the parties of notice about what they may reasonably expect. Tethering 
pro se leniency to due process will play an important role in promoting 
a coherent, consistent, and useful policy toward the unrepresented 
litigant. 
 
